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The purpose of this paper is twofold. The primary purpose is to try and explain both the temporal and the spatial 
variation of poverty rates in terms of unemployment insurance indicators and structural/sociodemographic 
factors. Secondly, the paper aims to test the ‘convergence hypothesis’ of the poverty rate, i.e. whether or not 
poverty rates in modern welfare states have converged in recent decades.  
The analyses tentatively suggest that structural change in terms of the unemployment rate, the proportion of 
single-earner households, the female labour-force participation rate, and the proportion of families with children 
primarily explains the temporal variation in poverty rates. The unemployment insurance factors primarily 
explain the spatial variation, i.e. variation between countries. In part, however, the temporal variation is 
explained by the cuts in net replacements in unemployment insurance. This factor alone explains a larger share 
of the overall variance than all the structural factors put together. 
Where the convergence hypothesis is concerned, a random-effects model is proposed as a statistical tool for 
testing convergence (and dispersion). The results of this analysis suggest that for the 16 countries and the time 
frame under review the convergence hypothesis must be rejected, an outcome that is in line with some other 
analyses presented recently. 
 
Sammanfattning 
Denna uppsats har två syften. Det primära syftet är att försöka förklara fattigdomsnivåernas tidsmässiga och 
rumsliga variation i 16 västländer mellan 1980 och 2000. Dedtta görs dels i termer av arbetslöshetsförsäkringens 
utformning, dels i termer av ett antal strukturella/ sociodemografiska faktorer. Det andra syftet är att testa 
”konvergenshypotesen”, vilken stipulerar att fattigdomsnivåerna i utvecklade välfärdsstater tenderar att 
konvergera. 
Resultaten från analyserna implicerar att strukturella förändringar, så som ökade arbetslöshetsnivåer, minskad 
andel en-försörjarhushåll, ökad kvinnlig förvärvsfrekvens och ökad andel barnfamiljer framför allt förklarar 
variationen över tid. Indikatorer på arbetslöshetsförsäkringens utformning förklarar framför allt variation i den 
rumsliga dimensionen, dvs. variationen mellan länder. Den nedåtgående trend som kan observeras när det gäller 
ersättningsnivåerna i arbetslöshetsförsäkringen i de olika länderna förklarar emellertid även en del av variationen 
över tid. Denna faktor förklarar ensam mer av den totala variationen än alla de strukturella/sociodemografiska 
faktorerna tillsammans. 
Som statistiskt verktyg för att testa konvergenshypotesen föreslås en random-effects modell. Resultatet från 
analysen tyder på att hypotesen måste förkastas, åtminstone för de länder och den tidsperiod som står i fokus för 




* This paper has benefited from comments made by Lars Brännström, Tommy Ferrarini, Johan Fritzell, Thomas 
Lindh, Kenneth Nelson, Joakim Palme, Ola Sjöberg and participants at the SCIP-meeting at the Danish National 
Institute of Social Research, Copenhagen in February, 2005.   1
Introduction 
Over the years, a number of studies in comparative social policy have shown that welfare 
state arrangements have a profound impact on financial poverty in western countries. These 
studies show that modern welfare states – although to a varying degree – have managed to 
mitigate poverty in those phases of the life cycle that have traditionally been associated with 
economic hardship, such as childhood, child rearing and old age (e.g. Ferrarini, 2003; Kangas 
and Palme, 2000). In many countries, however, the consequences of more occasional losses of 
market income in connection with such events as sickness and job loss have also been 
alleviated by welfare state activity (Kangas, 1991; Carroll, 1999). These and other studies 
further show that the extent to which different welfare states have succeeded in combating 
poverty is to a large extent determined by the design of social policy schemes (see also Korpi 
and Palme, 1998). Thus, it is not just the generosity of different schemes that matters in this 
respect but also the way in which the welfare state is organised. 
Although poverty and/or social exclusion can clearly be reduced by welfare state activity, this 
has by no means made it a less topical issue on the social policy agenda (Atkinson et al, 
2002). The trend in most western countries, at least since the beginning of the 1980s, has been 
growing financial poverty and income inequality (e.g. Ritakallio, 2002; Smeeding, 2002). 
Without doubt, comparative welfare state research has been highly successful in determining 
the impact of welfare state arrangements on the variation of poverty risks across countries. 
However, it has been less successful in identifying what drives the temporal variation of 
aggregate poverty rates. This is not of course due to a lack of skill among researchers but 
rather to a lack of adequate data. Hitherto, sufficiently long time series for a sufficiently large 
number of countries have not been available. But with the fourth and fifth wave of the 
Luxembourg Income Study (see Atkinson et al, 1995) we may now start filling this gap in 
comparative welfare state research. Some efforts in that direction have already been made 
(see Gustafsson and Johansson, 1999; Fritzell and Ritakallio, 2004).  
The purpose of this paper is thus to try and explain the variation in the relative poverty rate 
across countries as well as across time, in terms of both institutional and structural factors. As 
far as institutional factors are concerned, the analysis seeks to evaluate the effect of 
unemployment insurance on poverty rates. There are several reasons for focusing in particular 
on unemployment insurance. Firstly, there are practical reasons for choosing one programme 
at a time. Secondly, of those schemes that deal with the poverty risk-inducing phases and 
events mentioned above, unemployment insurance is perhaps the most controversial due to its   2
relatively direct interference with market processes (Carroll, 1999). The effectiveness of such 
a system seems important to evaluate. Thirdly, as opposed to family schemes, pension 
schemes and sickness cash benefit schemes, the relationship between poverty rates and 
unemployment insurance schemes has yet to be studied systematically. Finally, many of the 
structural factors that have been put forward as explanations for the cross-country variation of 
poverty rates, such as unemployment and female labour force participation (e.g. Kangas and 
Ritakallio, 2000; Fritzell and Ritakallio, 2004; Brady, 2004), relate to the labour market in 
one way or another. 
However, before the driving forces that shape the temporal pattern are described, the temporal 
pattern itself must be identified. Thus the first part of the analysis aims at testing how we 
should properly describe the development of poverty rates. 
The outline of the paper is as follows:  
The next section presents the institutional framework from which the paper departs. Both 
specific social insurance schemes focusing on unemployment insurance and welfare state 
typologies are discussed. This is followed by a section discussing structural factors and their 
potential impact on poverty levels in modern welfare states. As one of the purposes of the 
paper relates to the temporal dimension of poverty rates, the next section is devoted to a 
discussion of the development of institutional and structural factors and of poverty rates 
across time. Thereafter, the data and the operationalisations of variables are presented, 
followed by a methodological discussion. The results section begins by reporting the outcome 
of a random-effects model describing the temporal pattern of poverty rates. In this part of the 
analysis, special attention is paid to the question of whether poverty rates have converged, 
diverged or remained stable across time. The second part of the results section is devoted to 
the effects of the explanatory variables. The paper closes with a discussion of the results. 
Institutional framework 
There is a vast literature stressing the importance of the institutional structures of welfare 
states for social policy outcomes. It is argued that in order to understand the divergent 
effectiveness of poverty reduction, for instance, we need to go beyond the study of social 
expenditure which used to dominate the field (e.g. Wilensky, 1975; Pampel and Williamson, 
1985). Studies focusing on expenditure suffer from an ‘institutional deficit’ (Ferrarini, 
2003:4) since spending levels are likely to be affected by a number of factors beyond the   3
scope of social policy legislation.
1 Although it is unlikely that welfare state institutions would 
remain totally unaffected by changes in, say, employment or family formation patterns, there 
is a built-in inertia in these systems that militates against rapid response (Pierson 2001). Partly 
due to this, the institutional approach has proved useful both in the study of causes for welfare 
state formation and transformation, and for social policy outcomes (e.g. Carroll 1999; 
Ferrarini 2003; Korpi 2003; Korpi and Palme 2003).  
We can easily identify three institutional dimensions of welfare state arrangements that may 
be of crucial importance for determining the effectiveness of poverty alleviation in income 
maintenance programmes: eligibility, replacement rate, and period of payment. Eligibility as 
reflected by the coverage rate refers to how large a proportion of the population or workforce 
is covered by a particular type of insurance. It is determined by the basic qualification 
requirements associated with all types of insurance. The stricter these requirements are the 
lower the degree of coverage. Eligibility could also be affected by population changes. If 
immigration grows, the number of those ineligible for social insurance will increase, at least if 
the qualification requirements involve a certain amount of domestic labour market experience, 
which is usually the case for income related benefits. Replacement rate naturally refers to the 
level of cash benefits, i.e. the proportion of normal income that is actually paid by the 
insurance provider. Duration of payment period refers to both the beginning and end. At the 
beginning of payment periods, many schemes include non-payable qualifying days as a means 
of introducing self-insurance. At the other end of payment periods we are interested in their 
maximum duration. If the period is too short, a system that is generous in terms of the other 
two dimensions might still lack efficiency as regards poverty alleviation (Palme et al, 
2003:62-73). This would be of particular importance in unemployment insurance, since the 
risk for poverty and social exclusion grows considerably with an increasing duration of 
unemployment spells (e.g. Abrahamson et al, 1986; Atkinson et al, 2002; Kieselbach, 2003).  
Although the focus with regard to welfare state institutions is on unemployment insurance, it 
is important to recognise the significance of other benefit schemes for poverty alleviation. As 
mentioned earlier, the design of family policy schemes, sickness cash benefit schemes and 
pension schemes are important for poverty alleviation. Furthermore, means-tested benefits 
such as social assistance and housing allowances have some poverty alleviating effects 
                                                 
1 Moene and Wallerstein’s (2003) analysis of the effect of spending on economic inequality suffers from the 
same deficit, although it must be admitted that the more sophisticated analysis provided by these authors offers 
much useful information about the effectiveness of different social policy programs.   4
(Berendt, 2000). However, it has been shown that the way benefit schemes are organised in 
terms of means testing and non-targeted provisions is important for explaining differences in 
poverty alleviation. More specifically, the magnitude of non-targeted provisions is more 
important in this respect than that of means-tested benefits (Nelson, 2004). Also, in order to 
avoid omitted variable bias, the effects of these systems must be kept constant in one way or 
another in the analyses. One major problem of comparative welfare state research is that the 
‘samples’ are usually quite small. Since this obviously limits the number of co-variates in 
multivariate analyses, indicators of all these systems cannot be included simultaneously in a 
regression model. An alternative is to use some kind of global indicator for these systems. 
One approach would be to construct an index based on these schemes, but that would be 
inapplicable in cases where the individual items of such an index measure different 
dimensions. Another approach, which is the one adopted here, is to include indicators based 
on a welfare state typology.  
Several such typologies have flourished in the market for comparative welfare state research 
since Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990), where welfare state 
regimes were divided into three clusters labelled Conservative, Liberal, and Social Democrat 
according to the ideological currents underpinning each. Esping-Andersen’s typology has 
been highly influential, but has also been criticised. This has resulted in new, alternative 
classifications whereby categories have been split up or new ones added (e.g. Castles and 
Mitchell, 1991; Leibfried, 1992), depending on the focus of the criticism.  
Korpi and Palme’s (1998) typology of welfare states, too, partly derives from a critique of 
Esping-Andersen. Since his primary purpose was descriptive and he consequently allowed 
indicators on outcomes, institutional arrangements and political causes to define the three 
regime types, the analytical value of his model is limited. Korpi and Palme’s model, on the 
other hand, is developed solely on the basis of institutional arrangements and is specifically 
designed to be used analytically, both as a dependent variable in the study of welfare state 
formation and as an independent (intervening) variable in the study of social policy outcomes. 
For the purpose of the present paper, the analytical gains of such a purely institutional 
approach would seem to outweigh the more ‘holistic’ gains to be had from the 
multidimensional approaches advocated by Esping-Andersen and his followers. Korpi and 
Palme arrive at five ideal-typical welfare state regimes, based on the institutional structure of 
primarily old-age pension schemes and to some extent of sickness cash benefit programmes. 
These are: the targeted, the voluntary state-subsidised, the state corporatist, the basic security   5
and the encompassing welfare state model. The categorisation of the 16 countries included in 
the present study is shown in Table 1. None of these countries fall into the voluntary state-
subsidised category, and only one, Australia, falls into the targeted category. The targeted and 
the basic security models are therefore merged into one category in the following analyses. 
The targeted model is characterised by income or means tested benefits which are fairly 
similar in size for those who qualify. Eligibility in the basic security model is either 
citizenship-based or based on contributions. Benefits are flat-rate or earnings-related with a 
low income ceiling. Both systems tend to encourage high income earners to seek private 
solutions for income insurance. 
In the state corporatist model, eligibility is based on compulsory membership for specified 
occupational categories. Benefits in these systems are earnings-related and usually quite 
generous, but exclude persons outside the labour market. 
Benefits in encompassing welfare states are also usually quite generous and citizenship-based, 
providing flat-rate benefits for all groups and earnings-related benefits to the economically 
active. Since all citizens are included in the same earnings-related system the demand for 
private insurance tends to be limited. 
The reason why Korpi and Palme focus primarily on old-age pensions and to some extent on 
sickness cash benefit schemes is that these programmes provide protection from risks that 
people in all socio-economic categories are subject to. It is argued that because these two 
programmes have such a major economic impact for most citizens, their relevance for interest 
and coalition formation should be considerable. It would be legitimate to ask how a typology 
based primarily on old-age pensions can have any bearing on poverty risks among people of 
active age, which is the population stratum that the present paper focuses on (see below). 
Obviously, the institutional dimensions of pension schemes cannot possibly lift people below 
retirement age out of poverty. However, the logic of Korpi and Palme tells us that in 
encompassing welfare states, for instance, where practically all economically active groups 
are potentially eligible for earnings-related benefits, interest in preserving a generous welfare 
system is spread across socio-economic groups to an extent that cannot be found in countries 
in the basic cluster, for example. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that this widespread interest 
is not restricted to the pension scheme but applies to other schemes as well. This perception is 
supported by the fact that replacement rates in most social security programmes are higher in 
the encompassing and in the state corporatist countries, while countries with targeted and 
basic models lag behind. In the post-war period this is true for sickness cash benefits (Kangas   6
1991) and parental leave (Ferrarini 2003), and to a lesser extent for old-age pensions (Palme 
1990) and unemployment insurance (Carroll 1999). However, for coverage rates the picture is 
more mixed, and averaged at the beginning of the 1980s for all clusters somewhere between 
70 and 80 per cent for old-age pensions and unemployment insurance (Palme 1990; Carroll 
1999), and between 50 and 60 per cent for sickness cash benefits (Kangas 1991).
2 As regards 
the maximum duration of payment period, this tendency prevails in the case of parental leave 
(Ferrarini 2003). In the case of sickness cash benefits, on the other hand, the tendency is that 
the insurance schemes in the encompassing, the corporatist and the targeted welfare states are 
the most generous, while the basic security countries lag behind (Kangas 1991). As regards 
unemployment insurance, no particular pattern prevails in this dimension (Carroll 1999). 
Although the inclusion of the welfare regime type indicators might produce interesting results 
in their own right, in this study they are only used as control variables and as such their effects 
are discussed only briefly. 
Structural factors 
In their analyses of 11 welfare states, Fritzell and Ritakallio (2004) find that the increasing 
poverty rates noted in Western Europe since the beginning of the 1980s are more accurately 
explained in terms of structural shifts than in terms of welfare state retrenchment. On the 
other hand, the explanation of the variation between countries may to a great extent be sought 
in politics. Although imputation of the sociodemographic structure of Sweden in 2000 to ten 
other western countries shows that part of the cross-country variation disappears, the gap in 
poverty rates between welfare state regimes largely remains. This technique was also used by 
Kangas and Ritakallio (2000), when comparing Scandinavian and French poverty rates. They 
report that the difference between Scandinavia and France is almost eradicated in this 
particular case when the Scandinavian sociodemographic structure is imputed to France.
3 In 
both of these studies, sociodemography is defined by such factors as age, household 
composition, female labour force participation and the number of earners in households.  
Although illuminating, this technique presents certain problems recognised by the authors. 
Firstly, it is sensitive to what is chosen as the counterfactual case. Had Fritzell and Ritakallio 
                                                 
2 All replacement rates are net of an average production worker’s income (see below). Coverage rates are in 
percentage of populations 15-64 years of age (old-age pension and sickness cash benefits) and of employees 
(unemployment insurance). 
3 However, when the French socio-demographic structure was imputed to Scandinavian countries, poverty rates 
remained unchanged.   7
chosen some other observation than Sweden 2000 the results might have been different. When 
only a handful of countries are studied, this problem might prove less serious. Secondly, the 
sociodemographic structure is not independent of welfare state structure. This is particularly 
obvious in the case of female labour force participation. The high female labour force 
participation rates in Scandinavia are to a large extent a result of the welfare state 
arrangements in these countries (Ferrarini, 2003).  
This latter problem is not circumvented by using a regression approach. Thus, rather than 
competing, the counter-factual approach and the regression approach can complement one 
another since they have the potential for producing slightly different results. For example, 
Brady (2004) shows with a random-intercept regression approach that social security transfers 
and public health spending provide better explanations for poverty in 18 countries than do 
demographic variables.
4 In the present study, welfare state factors and (socio-)demographic 
factors are analysed side by side as well. However, by including time as a co-variate in the 
multivariate models, we can determine both whether ‘structural’ factors have an influence on 
the temporal variation and whether they affect the spatial variation of the poverty rate. The 
factors used in the analyses are unemployment, female labour force participation, the 
proportion of families with children, and the proportion of single-earner households in each 
country. Since the study focuses on unemployment insurance, only poverty among 
populations of active age is analysed. Thus the proportion of elderly in the population would 
obviously be a redundant variable.
5  
Of these factors, unemployment is of particular importance, since the study focuses on 
institutional aspects of unemployment insurance. In his second study of poverty in York in the 
early 20
th century, Rowntree (1942) identified unemployment as the principal poverty 
generator alongside old age and low wages. However, present-day welfare state expansion has 
made the relationship less self-evident. At the aggregate level in cross-country studies, the 
relationship between the two factors has been found to be either weak or non-existent (e.g. 
Cantillon et al, 2002; Haataja 1999). Brady (2004) found that neither unemployment nor the 
rate of non-participation in the labour market has had any impact on poverty in 18 countries. 
Across time, results vary considerably between countries. For example, Stenberg (1998) finds 
                                                 
4 The structural factors in Brady’s study are percentage of population not in employment and percentage of 
children in single mother families. 
5 A counter-argument is that if family care of elderly is frequent and in turn is poverty inducing the proportion of 
elderly would be a predictor of the poverty rate also in the population at active ages. It is assumed here that this 
effect is negligible.   8
a positive correlation for Sweden while Burgess et al (2001) find a negative correlation for the 
UK. One obvious reason for these differing results is that while Stenberg analyses the 
correlation between changes in the time series, Burgess et al report the correlation between 
trends for a period when the UK introduced dramatic cuts in a number of areas, including 
unemployment insurance (see Atkinson, 1989). Nevertheless, when unemployment afflicts a 
household, it usually incurs some economic cost. Thus the effect of unemployment on the 
poverty rate, if any, should be positive, i.e. the higher the unemployment rate the higher the 
poverty rate. 
Institutional change, structural change, and poverty 
The financial poverty curve in most advanced welfare states has been pointing upwards since 
the 1980s (Fritzell and Ritakallio, 2004). There are of course a multitude of reasons for this 
development, and different authors emphasise different set of explanations. Generally 
speaking, however, the two set of factors under review in this study – structural and social 
policy factors – dominate. Structural factors can in turn be split up into exogenous and 
endogenous factors (Brady, 2004). Exogenous factors include globalisation and the 
international business cycle. Endogenous factors are typically those sociodemographic and 
labour market variables discussed in the previous section. The present study focuses mainly 
on endogenous factors. 
In recent decades, employment and family formation patterns have changed in most western 
countries. The increase in female labour force participation and the lower average size of 
families are perhaps the most significant shifts (Fritzell and Ritakallio, 2004). Although the 
importance of these factors for the growth in poverty rates has been recognised, studies that 
explicitly set out to explain variation across time are rare. Brady (2004) analyses both the 
temporal variation and the cross-country variation of poverty in random-intercept models. 
Although he reports the variance at both the country and the temporal level, the way he 
specifies his models prevents him from drawing any conclusions about which factors can 
explain the temporal variation. It is clear that most of the variation is found at the country 
level, and this fact may justify his focus on it. However, although most of the variation can be 
expected to be found at the country level, there is no reason to ignore the temporal dimension. 
As should be clear from the discussion in previous sections, cross-country differences in 
poverty rates can to a great extent be explained in social-policy and sociodemographic terms. 
Temporal variation, on the other hand, has been less carefully explored, and, as already   9
mentioned, part of the purpose of this paper is to add something to those findings that already 
exist. 
In order to reach conclusions about the temporal variation, poverty must be modelled as a 
function of time. A light version of this approach is presented by Fritzell and Ritakallio 
(2004), who investigate whether or not poverty rates have converged in 11 welfare states by 
inspecting changes in the standard deviation and coefficient of variance. They gather that 
there is a tendency in that direction, but cannot draw any firm conclusions. This is primarily 
because they lack a statistical test of convergence. Such a test is suggested below, in a 
random-effects framework. 
However, using the 60 per cent of median income poverty threshold, Fritzell and Ritakallio 
(2004) do find that between 1980 and 2000 poverty rates increased in most countries in their 
panel. In Finland poverty rates declined, while the Norwegian and Canadian rates remained 
practically unchanged. The greatest increase was found in the UK. When comparing the 1990 
and 2000 poverty rates, they were found to have gone up in Finland and Canada as well. 
It should come as no surprise that more countries fall into the pattern of increasing poverty 
rates when the focus is specifically on the 1990s. This decade is often described as one of 
economic crisis and welfare state retrenchment in most western countries (see for instance 
Stephens et al, 1999; Korpi and Palme, 2003; Palme et al, 2003). According to Brady (2004), 
this suggests that the relationship between indicators of welfare state generosity and poverty 
during this period is open to question. In order to test his proposal, Brady includes interaction 
terms between a dummy representing the 1990s and two ‘welfare state variables’ in a 
regression model. The interaction effects fail to appear, which leads to the conclusion that the 
underlying causes of poverty do not change in the 1990s.  
On the basis of these earlier studies, we should expect welfare state variables to explain more 
of the overall variance in the poverty rate than structural variables. However, since the 
structure of data is such that the number of countries far exceeds the number of time points, 
most of the variance may be expected to appear at the country level. This means that the 
parameter estimates obtained in regression analyses on this type of panel data primarily refer 
to the cross-country variation and tell us very little about the reasons for temporal variation. 
Since studies adopting a regression approach and explicitly seeking to explore the driving 
forces behind the temporal variation of poverty rates across countries have not been found in 
the literature, previous research provides little guidance as to what effects on the temporal 
variation we would expect from the explanatory variables in a regression analysis. We do   10
know, however, from Fritzell and Ritakallio’s (2004) more exploratory approach, that there is 
a tendency for structural factors to provide better explanations than social policy factors for 
temporal variation, while the opposite tends to apply in the case of spatial variation.  
Data and operationalisations 
The analyses in this study combine data from a number of sources. The poverty rates are 
calculated on data from the Luxembourg Income Study, LIS (see Atkinson, Rainwater and 
Smeeding, 1995). A relative poverty threshold is used, where people with less than half the 
median disposable income in a country are defined as poor. This is partly for practical 
reasons, since it makes international comparisons easier. But it is also theoretically motivated, 
since the average standard of living in a particular country is the most relevant comparison 
point for most of its citizens. This practice can be criticised from several viewpoints and the 
choice might have implications for what results can be obtained (see for instance Ruggeri 
Laderchi et al, 2003; Danziger and Jäntti, 2000). Clearly, relative income poverty measures 
are merely proxies for a more profound theoretical poverty concept. However, there is a vast 
literature in this area, which this is not the place to consider (see Atkinson et al, 2002, p 78ff, 
for a discussion). The poverty line (half median income) was calculated for the population 
older than 21, while the poverty rate was calculated for those aged 21-59. In the construction 
of disposable income, the ‘traditional’ OECD equivalence scale was used to weight for family 
size. In this scale, the first adult is assigned the weight 1, other adults 0.7, and children 0.5. 
Like the choice of poverty measure, the choice of equivalence scale may have implications for 
the results (see for instance Danziger and Jäntti, 2000).Thus in sensitivity analyses an 
alternative equivalence scale is tested as well (see below). Also the effect of setting the 
poverty threshold at 60 per cent of median income is analysed in sensitivity analyses. 
The data in LIS are ‘lissified’, which means that they are harmonised in order to maximise 
comparability across countries and across years. Despite lissification there are comparability 
problems in LIS data. Van den Bosch and Marx (1996) evaluated the comparability in the 
data available at that time, i.e. up to and including the third wave. Since then, however, some 
of the data sets that they judge incomparable have been revised and now appear more 
comparable. For instance, this is the case for Germany 1989. Moreover, Van den Bosch and 
Marx compare the trend in average household income in order to judge comparability, and it 
would seem that comparing relative poverty rates is not equally sensitive to the problems that 
these authors identify. Of those countries and years available in both LIS and SCIP (see 
below), only the LIS data set for Austria 1985 appears too unreliable to use in the analyses.   11
Since the focus is on unemployment insurance, only data for populations of active age (21-59) 
have been used. 
The data on net replacements, coverage rates and maximum duration of period of payment in 
the unemployment insurance schemes of the countries included in the study emanate from the 
Social Citizenship Indicators Programme (SCIP) being assembled at the Swedish Institute for 
Social Research, Stockholm University (see for instance Korpi and Palme, 2003). The SCIP 
data archives include legislated social citizenship rights in eighteen OECD countries in 1930-
1995, with data points for approximately every fifth year.
6 In the SCIP data, several indicators 
of net replacement in the unemployment insurance are available. The one chosen for the 
analyses below is an index indicating the net average replacement rate in per cent during the 
first 26 weeks of unemployment for an average production worker. The coverage rate is 
measured as the percentage of the labour force covered by the insurance. Maximum duration 
is measured in weeks. Duration in cases where the period of payment is unlimited has 
arbitrarily been set at 104 weeks (2 years). The period is assumed to end when the benefit 
becomes either means- or income-tested or when it becomes linked to additional 
contributions, work requirements or participation in active labour market programmes (see 
Sjöberg 2000a). The institutional typology of Korpi and Palme (1998) is also based on SCIP 
data. 
Unemployment (percentage of the labour force) and gender-specific labour force participation 
(percentage of the population aged 20-69) are the standardised rates as published by the 
OECD (SourceOECD). In the analyses, only the female labour force participation rate is 
included in the regression models. This variable has been operationalised as female labour 
force participation as a percentage of male labour force participation. 
The percentages of single earner households and families with children have been calculated 
from the LIS data sets. The figures for single earner households for Ireland 1987 and Norway 
1986 and for families with children for France 1981 are not realistic. Thus, these observations 
are not included in the analyses. 
The number of data points is restricted by the availability in LIS and in SCIP. Data from the 
first LIS wave (1980 and surrounding years) through the fifth wave (2000 and surrounding 
years) are used. The data points in SCIP correspond to the LIS waves. However, some 
                                                 
6 The countries included in SCIP are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA.   12
countries provide data for more than a single year in one LIS wave. In these cases, the same 
SCIP data is used for all years in that wave (see Table 1). Likewise, for some of the countries 
in the fifth LIS wave, SCIP data are as yet unavailable. In these cases – Canada, Finland, and 
coverage for Ireland – 1995 SCIP figures have been used. The data from the OECD are 
unique for each year. In all, data for sixteen SCIP countries are available in LIS (excluding 
the historical data sets). For these countries, 75 data points may be used (see Table 1). 
Methodological considerations 
The first part of the analysis below aims to depict the temporal structure of poverty rates. This 
is done in two steps. The first step is to fit a random-intercept model with poverty rate as the 
dependent variable and time as the only co-variate to data. This model serves primarily as a 
point of comparison for the model in the next step. However, it provides some interesting 
‘bonus material’. Firstly, it gives information about the slope of the time trend (although this 
information is also provided by succeeding models). If the sign of the parameter associated 
with time is positive, the average poverty rate has increased in the sample of countries. If it is 
negative, poverty has decreased, and if it is zero or close to zero, poverty rates have remained 
stable. Secondly, in this type of model the intercept is allowed to vary across level 2 units, in 
this case countries. The procedure partitions the explained variance into two terms (Twisk, 
2003): one for level 2 variance (country level) and one for level 1 variance. On the basis of 
this information it is possible to calculate the intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC). The 
value of this coefficient, which varies between 0 and 1, tells us how large a proportion of the 
variance is attributable to level 2, i.e. the proportion of the total variation attributable to the 
variation across countries.  
The next step is to determine whether or not poverty rates have converged in the panel of 
countries. This is accomplished by also letting the variance of the parameter estimate 
associated with time vary across countries, in a model with a random slope, in addition to the 
random intercept. This model produces two additional terms: the variance in the random slope 
and the co-variance of the random intercept and random slope. The latter is crucial to the 
convergence hypothesis. If this co-variance is significantly negative, level 2 units with low 
values on the intercept have steeper slopes for the time variable (Twisk, 2003, p 85). In other 
words, a negative co-variance suggests that in countries with low average poverty rates the 
increase of poverty is faster than in countries with high average poverty rates (for further 
reading, see Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992; Twisk, 2003; Goldstein, 2003).   13
Contrary to what Brady (2004) claims, these models prove very unstable when additional co-
variates are included. Thus some other estimation technique must be employed for this part of 
the analysis. 
As is evident from Table 1, the 75 observations from the 16 countries provide an unbalanced 
panel, where different countries contribute different numbers of observations, ranging from 
two (Switzerland and Denmark) to eight (Italy). As is also shown in Table 1, the time span 
between observations varies considerably. 
Table 1. Countries and years included in the analyses. Countries grouped by institutional type. 
  LIS Wave I   
SCIP year: 1980 
LIS Wave II  
SCIP year: 1985 
LIS Wave III 
SCIP year: 1990 
LIS Wave IV 
SCIP year: 1995 
LIS Wave V 
SCIP year: 2000 
Encompassing:    
Finland   1987 1991 1995  2000
a
Norway 1979  1991 1995  2000
Sweden 1981  1987 1992 1995  2000
State Corporatist:     
Austria   1987 1994,  1997 
Belgium   1985 1988,  1992 1997  2000
France 1979  1984 1989 1994 
Germany 1981  1983,  1984 1989 1994  2000
Italy    1986, 1987 1989, 1991 1993, 1995  1998, 2000
Basic/Targeted:    
Australia 1981  1985 1989 1994 
Canada  1981   1987 1991 1994, 1997, 1998  2000
 a
Denmark   1987 1992  
Ireland   1994,  1995,  1996  2000
 b
Netherlands   1983,  1987 1991 1994  1999
Switzerland 1982  1992  
U.K. 1979  1986 1991 1994,  1995  1999
U.S. 1979  1986 1991 1994,  1997  2000
a SCIP data for 1995 are used in the analyses. 
b Coverage data from SCIP 1995 is used. 
 
It is well known that in regression analyses of panel data the standard assumption that error 
terms are independent across observations is unlikely to be satisfied. In the present paper, this 
problem is solved by using the Huber and White robust estimator of standard errors. This 
approach is quite straightforward, but still capable of relaxing the assumption of correlated 
error terms. In essence, it assumes that each observation can contribute differently to the 
variance, and this contribution is weighted into the formula. This feature means that instead of 
letting each observation contribute differently to the variance we can let clusters of 
observations (in the present case countries) contribute differently to the variance, and assume 
only that observations within clusters contribute equally. Ignoring the finite sample   14
adjustment, this generalised case of the robust standard estimator of variance can be written 
as:
7 
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where  ()
1 2 2 / ln ˆ
−
∂ ∂ − = β L V , the conventional estimator of variance, and  () G
k u  is the 
contribution of the kth group to the scores  β ∂ ∂ / lnL , and M is the number of independent 
clusters G1, G2, ..., GM that the data set is divided into (for further reading see Stata Users 
Guide Release 6, 1999 pp 256-259; White 1982; Schrader and Hettmansperger 1980; Huber 
1973; for an application on comparative social policy research, see Bradley et al, 2003).  
The robust estimator of variance has no influence on parameter estimates. Thus, since the 
panel of countries is unbalanced in the sense that they are observed a different number of 
times, a weighting procedure is used in order to give each country equal weight independently 
of how many observations they actually provide in the analyses. 
The robust estimator of variance is used in all regression models, including random-effects 
models. 
Results 
We begin by considering Table 2, showing the results from the random-effects models.
8 The 
parameter estimates for time in both models suggest that on average poverty rates increase by 
approximately 0.1 percentage points per year for the period under review. For the twenty-year 
period as a whole, this implies an average increase of two percentage points.  
As noted above, the most crucial information in this model, for the purposes of the present 
paper, is that which is provided by the ICC. As expected, the ICC indicates that the bulk of 
the variation, 88 per cent, is found at the country level. The remaining 12 per cent is thus 
attributable to the temporal dimension. Brady (2004) does not report the ICC. Although he 
uses an alternative poverty measure we can compare the ICC in Table 2 with that which may 
be calculated from the least elaborate of Brady’s models (Brady, 2004, Model 1 in Table 3), 
rendering an ICC of 0.91, which is fairly similar to that obtained here.  
 
                                                 
7 The finite sample adjustment for clustered data is [M/(M-1)][(N-1)/(N-K)]. 
8 The random-effects models have been estimated with the statistical software MLwiN (Rasbash et al, 2004)   15
Table 2. Random-effects models with random intercept (1) and with random intercept and random slope (2) on 
the poverty rate (50% of median income) in 16 countries 1980-2000. P-values in brackets. 
 1  2 
Time  .12 (<.001)  .12 (.001) 
Constant  6.94 (<.001)  6.91 (<.001)
RANDOM PART 
* 
Level 2 variance: 
  
var (intercept)  14.05 (.006)  12.48 (.017) 
var (slope)  -  .008 (.253) 
cov (intercept,slope)  -  .004 (.977) 
Level 1 variance:    
var (time)  1.93 (<.001)  1.62 (<.001)
ICC .88  - 
LLR 109.84
† 2.90 
df 1  2 
prob (df, LLR)  <.001  .235 
* P-values in the random part are approximations. 
† In relation to a single-level regression model. 
 
Despite the fact that most variation is attributable to the country level, it is important to 
investigate the nature of the temporal dimension. In the second model of Table 2, where the 
random slope is allowed for, we embark on the first step in this analysis. As discussed in the 
previous section, the sign of the co-variance determines whether or not there is any 
‘interaction’ between the random intercept and the random slope. The table shows that the co-
variance term is close to zero and far from significant according to its p-value (z-test). 
However, it should be noted that the z-scores associated with the random-effects parameters 
are only approximations (Rasbash et al, 2004). But since the more appropriate LLR test, too, 
shows that the random-slope model does not provide a better fit than the random-intercept 
model, we must conclude that there is no indication of convergence (or dispersion) for the 
countries and time period under review. This result is in line with the finding of Fritzell and 
Ritakallio (2004). Although these authors have observed a slight tendency towards 
convergence, it is not salient enough to conclude that poverty rates actually have converged. 
Having determined the amount of variation attributable to the temporal level, and the need to 
reject the convergence hypothesis, we can now turn to the causal structure of poverty in both 
its temporal and its spatial dimensions. This is done by estimating OLS regression models 
with robust standard errors, where the relative poverty rate is the dependent variable and 
where time is included as a co-variate throughout. This enables us to see to what degree the 
effect of time on poverty changes when other factors are included in the model. It should be 
noted that the degrees of freedom in models with robust standard errors on clustered data are 
settled by the formula N-k-1, where N is not equal to the number of observations but to the   16
number of clusters, in this case countries. The letter k denotes the number of parameters in the 
model. This obviously places restrictions on the number of co-variates that can be included in 
the regression models. As a result, Table 3 shows the results from models where the factors of 
prime interest are included one at a time, as clusters, and also as clusters together with 
indicators on welfare state models according to Korpi and Palme (1998). However, all 
variables cannot be included simultaneously; therefore ‘structural’ factors and ‘institutional’ 
social policy factors are analysed separately.  
First we observe that the effect of time is practically unchanged as compared to the random-
effects models, although its p-value has increased. With this approach the development over 
time of the poverty rate is modelled as a linear function. This is certainly a strong assumption. 
To check it, alternative functional forms for the time variable, such as quadratic and cubic 
forms, have been tested in models not reported here. We then find that although the cubic 
form slightly improves the fit, it produces an unrealistic shape in the trend over time. Given 
the fact that the linear function produces a more realistic shape, and that the cubic function 
erodes degrees of freedom, the former is chosen for the succeeding models.
9  
In models 2-7, the structural, sociodemographic variables are included. First separately 
(models 2-5), and then together, both without controlling for the welfare state model (Model 
6) and with such controls (Model 7). In Model 2, unemployment is included. While it clearly 
has no effect on the overall variation of poverty rates, the inclusion of this variable reduces 
the effect of time from 0.12 to 0.07. This suggests that although unemployment has no effect 
on the overall variance of the poverty rate, dominated by cross-country variation, it might be 
important for what happens over time. On average the unemployment rate has increased 
during the period under review. 
Model 3 shows that the proportion of single earner households has no effect on the poverty 
rate, either. However, as in Model 2, the inclusion of this factor has implications for the effect 
of time. Here, the time parameter increases, implying that had the proportion of single earner 
households remained stable over the period, instead of decreasing, the poverty rate would 
have increased faster.  
                                                 
9 A dummy representation of time does not assume a particular shape, but this approach is not appropriate when 
the time points are unequally spaced (Twisk, 2003, p 96). Table 3. Estimates of OLS regression with robust standard errors on the relative poverty rate in 16 countries. P-values in brackets. 
  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
Time  .11 (.071)  .07 (.191)  .16 (.070)  .22 (.001)  .20 (.006)  .22 (.008)  .22 (.012) 
Unempl.  %    .23(.267)      .09  (.683)  .02  (.951) 
Single earner %      .72 (.342)      -.06 (.433)  -.06 (.384) 
Female lab. force part. %        -.14 (.022)    -.15 (.099)  -.07 (.625) 
Families w. children %          .25 (.035)  .15 (.304)  .18 (.185) 
E n c o m p a s s i n g          0  
State  Corporatist         3.22  (.173) 
Basic/targeted         5.53  (.044) 
Constant  7.10 (<.001)  5.88 (.002)  3.28 (.457)  16.36 (<.001) -10.21 (.168)  8.60 (.542)  -2.54 (.894) 
R
2  .03 .06 .06 .16 .15 .23 .46 
N  (countries)  16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
N  (observations)  75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
 
 
Table 3 continued… 
  8  9  10 11 12 
Time  .04 (.455)  .12 (.031)  .13 (.056)  .08 (.208)  .14 (.034) 
Net replacements %  -.13 (<.001)     -.10  (.036) -.07  (.060) 
Coverage rate %    -.03 (.299)    -.02 (.665)  -.03 (.189) 
Max. duration      -.06 (.047)  -.05 (.083)  -.06 (.017) 
Encompassing       0 
State  Corporatist       .64  (.567) 
Basic/targeted       4.11  (<.001) 
Constant  15.49 (<.001)  9.02 (<.001)  11.10 (<.001)  17.70 (<.001)  14.41 (<.001) 
R
2 .34  .05  .26 .48 .68 
N  (countries)  16 16 16 16 16 
N  (observations)  75 75 75 75 75 
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A similar pattern is found in Model 4, where the female labour force participation rate is 
entered into the model, although this variable seems to have effects on both the temporal and 
the spatial variation of poverty. The parameter estimate suggests that an increase of the 
female labour force by one percentage point reduces the poverty rate by 0.14 percentage 
points. The change in the time parameter implies that if female labour force participation had 
not increased as rapidly as it has in recent decades, poverty rates would have increased 
substantially more than they in fact did. 
The same is true of the effect that the proportion of families with children has in Model 5. 
Had not this proportion declined, poverty rates would have been greater in year 2000 than 
they actually were. As with female labour force participation, this variable has an impact on 
the overall variation of poverty, implying that the greater the proportion of families with 
children the greater the poverty rate. 
In Model 6, where all structural factors are entered simultaneously, only female labour force 
participation is significant at the 10 per cent level. The magnitude of its parameter estimate 
remains practically unchanged, while the other estimates are substantially reduced. Again, the 
change in the time parameter as compared to that in Model 1 indicates that had these factors, 
taken together, remained at their initial levels, poverty rates would have increased faster than 
was in fact the case. The time parameter is only slightly reduced when controls are introduced 
for welfare state model in Model 7. This is quite logical since this factor is time-invariant. 
However, the effect of female labour force participation is mediated by the welfare state 
model factor. This is because female labour force participation is greater in the encompassing 
countries than in the state corporatist countries in particular, but also greater than in the 
countries in the basic/targeted cluster. As previous studies show, countries in the state 
corporatist cluster tend to promote single (male) breadwinner households (Ferrarini, 2003), 
which seems to explain much of the difference between this and the encompassing cluster. 
Between the encompassing and the basic/targeted welfare state, part of the difference in 
poverty rates remains after adjustment for the structural factors. Although this does not show 
up in the table, it is worth mentioning that the difference between state corporatist and the 
basic/targeted parameters is insignificant. 
Models 8-12 focus on the effect of the institutional dimensions of unemployment insurance. 
In the first of these, Model 8, net replacements are shown to have the expected negative effect 
on poverty rates. Taken ‘literally’, the parameter estimate indicates that a reduction of 
replacement rates by one percentage point increases poverty rates by 0.13 percentage points.   19
The parameter estimate of time is halved when the net replacement indicator is included, 
suggesting that had not replacement rates declined during the period, poverty rates would 
have shown a slower increase. Note, too, that the proportion of explained variance in this 
model by far exceeds that of Model 6 where all structural factors are included.  
Unemployment insurance coverage, on the other hand, seems to be uncorrelated to financial 
poverty in this data set. Also, the effect of time remains unaffected when this variable is 
included. This should not be taken to mean that coverage rate is irrelevant. Obviously, there 
must be a lower limit for the coverage rate at which both the replacement rate and the period 
of payment become redundant as far as poverty alleviation is concerned. If the insurance 
scheme covers only a small fraction of the population, it is irrelevant whether the replacement 
rate is 30 or 130 percent. Statistically, this implies that there would be an interaction effect 
between replacements and coverage as well as between period of payment and coverage, but 
such analyses lie beyond the scope of the present paper. It should also be noted that the 
coverage rate in the means-tested Australian system has been set to zero. However, in 
alternative models not shown here, excluding Australia from the analysis does not affect 
results. 
As with net replacements, Model 10 shows an expected negative effect of maximum duration 
on the overall variation of the poverty rate, while it seems to have no effect on temporal 
variation, judging by the unchanged time parameter. As measured by SCIP data, average 
maximum duration rises during the first half of the period under review, but declines during 
the latter half. Accordingly, it is quite logical that this factor does not affect the more linear 
poverty trend although it obviously has important implications for the variation of poverty in 
the other (spatial) dimension. 
Model 11 shows that with the time variable, these factors explain 48 per cent of the overall 
variance of the poverty rate, while the structural factors explain only 25 percent. However, the 
impact on the time parameter of the unemployment insurance indicators is weaker than that of 
the structural factors. Thus it would appear that these structural factors are of greater 
importance for the temporal variation of the poverty rate, while the unemployment insurance 
is more important for explaining differences between countries.  
In Model 12, finally, the control for welfare state model has been added. The only difference 
compared to Model 11 is that the effect of net replacements is slightly reduced. Naturally, this 
is due to the fact that net replacements vary across institutional types, as noted above. 
Comparing Model 7 with Model 12, we find that the effect of basic/targeted welfare states is   20
slightly lower in the latter than in the former. Thus, only a small fraction of the difference 
between encompassing and basic/targeted welfare states is attributable to differences in the 
unemployment benefit schemes.
10 The difference between the estimates associated with the 
state corporatist dummy in Model 7 and Model 12, on the other hand, is more profound. The 
difference between the state corporatist and the encompassing dummy is practically 
eradicated in Model 12. More sensitive analyses not reported here show that this result is 
obtained not by any single dimension but by the three unemployment insurance dimensions 
taken together. The unemployment insurance variables, of course, may well capture the 
structure of other social insurance schemes. Thus, the difference between state corporatist and 
encompassing welfare states is to a large degree dependent if not on unemployment insurance 
at least on the generosity of social insurance in general. Such a result is not out of the 
ordinary. More interesting in this respect is the fact that the relatively strong deviation of 
countries with the basic/targeted welfare state model prevails in Model 12. This clearly 
indicates that not only are replacements rates, etc, of importance for poverty alleviation, but 
also the institutional structure, presumably in terms of income protection vs. flat-rate benefits. 
As noted above, the choice of poverty indicator is partly an arbitrary one and may be a further 
factor influencing the outcome. In order to tentatively test the sensitivity of the results in this 
respect, the regression models in Table 3 have been run both with an alternative poverty 
threshold at 60 per cent of median income and with an alternative equivalence scale where the 
first adult is given the weight 1, the second adult 0.5, and children 0.3 (results not shown). 
These analyses produce no substantive deviations from the results in Table 3. In fact, the only 
change worth mentioning is that the p-value of the state corporatist dummy in Model 7 falls 
below the 10 per cent level when the 60 per cent threshold is used. Moreover, in analyses not 
reported here the models in Table 3 were re-run with adjustment for the domestic growth rate 
and the aggregate growth rate
11 for the 16 countries respectively. These analyses did not 
change the results. This was also the case for models where the observations from LIS Wave 
V were excluded. Finally, indicators on the generosity of family policy schemes (see 
Ferrarini, 2003) were included in Models 8-12 to see whether or not the effects of the 
                                                 
10 This is also confirmed when comparisons are made with a model incorporating only welfare state type 
dummies and time, where the effect of the state corporatist dummy is 3.81 and of the basic/targeted dummy 6.41. 
Both with p-values well below 0.05. 
11 Both factors measure the annual GDP growth rate for each country and for all countries respectively. Data are 
derived from Penn World Tables (Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2002)   21
unemployment insurance indicators were reduced. This was not the case; rather the results 
indicate that these two social policy schemes have independent effects on poverty rates. 
Discussion 
The primary purpose of this paper has been to depict the causal structure of the poverty rate 
variation in both its spatial and its temporal dimensions. The general pattern that emerges in 
these analyses is the tendency whereby the structural factors explain temporal variation better 
while the social policy factors more fully explain the spatial, cross-country variation. As a 
result of their impact primarily on cross-country variation, social policy factors also have 
better explanatory value for the overall variation of poverty. However, there are some 
exceptions to this general pattern. Female labour force participation, the proportion of 
families with children, and the net replacement rate in unemployment insurance, for instance, 
all have effects in both dimensions.  
The social policy focus of this paper has primarily been on unemployment insurance 
institutions. This focus was partly due to the fact that the effectiveness of such schemes in 
terms of poverty alleviation had not yet been evaluated systematically. Clearly, the design of 
unemployment insurance schemes is important for understanding the variation of poverty 
rates across countries. Of the three institutional dimensions evaluated here, the net 
replacement rate stands out as the most important, since it has effects in both the temporal and 
the spatial dimension. Moreover, this factor alone explains a larger share of the overall 
variance than all the structural factors taken together. The maximum duration of payment 
period in unemployment insurance is also of explanatory value for the overall variation, 
although not to the same extent as net replacements. Furthermore, as opposed to net 
replacements, this factor has no impact on the time effect, at least not in the way time has 
been modelled in these analyses. Finally, as discussed above, the coverage rate does not show 
enough variation to explain either the temporal or the spatial variation of poverty.  
The period under review in this study, especially the latter half of it, has been described as 
one of welfare state retrenchment (Korpi and Palme, 2003). The results of the study indicate 
that this retrenchment, in terms of cuts in unemployment cash benefits, has had negative 
implications for the poverty risks in contemporary welfare states. Both in the academic and 
the political debate, it is sometimes argued that generous unemployment schemes may be 
counterproductive in the sense that they tend to create perverse work incentives, trapping 
people in unemployment and poverty. The results of the analyses presented here indicate that   22
generous unemployment benefits do not trap people in poverty, on the contrary. The 
relationship between poverty traps and social policy schemes is probably more a question of 
the institutional arrangements involved concerning eligibility, in terms not of coverage rate 
but of means-tested and non means-tested provisions (see for instance Korpi, 1980). Since 
means-tested benefits –although with a few important exceptions – nearly always produce a 
marginal effect of 100 per cent in cases where a benefit recipient moves from non-work to 
work, such systems are more likely to produce poverty traps than universal benefits. In the 
present study, such an interpretation is supported by the fact that the effects of the 
unemployment insurance indicators are reduced when the welfare regime typology indicators 
are brought into the regression model. Whether or not generous unemployment benefits trap 
people in unemployment, this study cannot say. However, there are indications that generous 
unemployment schemes, in particular in terms of lengthy payment periods, may promote 
unemployment (e.g. Sjöberg, 2000b) and reduce work commitment (Esser, 2005). These 
findings present a dilemma for policy makers. If generous unemployment schemes both 
reduce poverty and promote unemployment, the generosity level at which unemployment 
insurances should be set involves a trade-off that is primarily political. However, in 
contemplating this, it should be borne in mind that the dilemma derives from the maximum 
duration of period of payment. Neither Sjöberg (2000b) nor Esser (2005) find any negative 
effects of generosity in terms of net replacements on unemployment rates and work 
commitment respectively.  
Most studies using panel data for cross-country studies of things like poverty or income 
inequality utilise the panel primarily as a means of increasing the number of observations. 
The conclusions drawn from such studies focus exclusively on cross-country explanations. 
The results from the present study and that of Brady (2004) show that this is perfectly 
legitimate since a major part of the variation is found at the country level. In fact, only about 
10 per cent of the variance is attributable to the temporal dimension. However, this is partly 
due to the structure of the panel, where there are more observation points across countries 
than across time. In the best of worlds we would have had access to annual data for the 
countries included, and with such a data set the variation at the two levels would probably 
have been more evenly distributed 
As should be clear from the analyses presented here, the small part of the variation 
attributable to the temporal dimension must not be used as an argument for ignoring this 
dimension. Rather, it should be used as an explanation as to why the effects on poverty rates   23
we would expect from some factors fail to appear. Such explanations are not possible, 
however, without modelling the poverty rate as a function of time. For instance, if time had 
not been included in the models, the straightforward interpretation of the effect of 
unemployment would have been that it is not important for the poverty variation. 
Undoubtedly, this is correct as long as we only discuss the difference between countries. But 
since the inclusion of this factor has a profound impact on the effect of time, we must also 
conclude that it is indeed important for understanding the increase of poverty rates in these 
countries across the years 1980-2000. 
Inversely, the inclusion of the time factor also tells us which factors affect the overall 
variation of poverty but not the temporal variation. In the present study, such an outcome is 
found for the indicator on maximum duration of unemployment benefits. This factor has a 
negative effect on the overall variation of poverty, implying the longer the maximum duration 
of the period, the lower the poverty rate. However, the development of this factor across time 
in the countries under review has not been such as to affect the development of poverty across 
time. 
As far as the development of poverty rates across time is concerned, the results of the present 
study suggest that although they have increased on average between 1980 and 2000, they 
have neither converged nor are in the process of converging. Although globalisation theory 
and to some extent theories concerning the logic of industrialism (Kerr et al, 1960; Gray, 
1998) suggest that we would expect to see such a pattern among modern welfare states it must 
be concluded that the convergence hypothesis does not pass the test. However, it should be 
noted that these theoretical currents are concerned with much longer time periods than the 
ones analysed in the present paper. Such hypotheses for the period 1980-2000 could probably 
be derived from these theories, but it would still be unfair to say that they have been falsified 
on the basis of the results presented here. Nevertheless, the results are in line with those 
obtained by Fritzell and Ritakallio (2004), although these authors had to rely on a less 
objective criterion than that employed here. The random effects approach proposed in the 
present study might need further evaluation, but it seems safe to assume that it could very 
well be used as a tool for testing convergence (and divergence) hypotheses in many other 
areas besides that of poverty alleviation. One such research area might concern whether or not 
different dimensions of social policy institutions are converging in modern welfare states (e.g. 
Montanari, 2001).   24
In sum, the overall conclusion that may be drawn from the analyses presented here is that 
policy does have an impact, not only on cross-country differences in the poverty rate but also 
on the development of the rate across time. The former result does no more than confirm the 
findings of a number of studies focusing on that level of variation. The latter result, too, may 
come as no surprise, since such hypotheses have previously been inferred or even taken for 
granted by other authors, but they have never been explicitly analysed. 
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